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SPECIFIC ACTS AND RELATED MATTERS AS AFFECTING
CREDIBILITY
By Wnmiui G. HALE
Professorof Law, Hastings College of the Law
Dean Emeritus, School of Law, University of Southern California

I. Specific Acts
A. ACTS AS INDICATIVE OF CHARACTER
It is important to observe whether the attack is upon the character of
the witness as affecting his credibility, or whether it goes to a matter of bias
or motive to falsify. First let us consider the characterphase of the problem.
Let us take a concrete case. It is claimed that W when a witness in
another case committed perjury.
If W had been convicted of this act of perjury all courts would agree
that the record of this conviction would be admitted. Even in such case the
evil of surprise is present but only to a minor degree. The essence of such
evil is that one is not advised in advance that the issue will arise and, therefore, that he will not be prepared in advance to meet it with countervailing
evidence. But in the instance supposed only two issues are involved, one
whether there was a conviction (and this is limited to the record-a simple
matter-and the record speaking for itself), and the other the identity of W
as the one thus convicted. The latter could be a more difficult issue and
evidence opposing the identity might not be readily available. Such evil might
be somewhat obviated by requiring that W first be asked on cross-examination
as to such conviction. This would serve as a warning and thus make possible
some time to prepare to meet the issue by other witnesses. As a practical
matter such inquiry is usually made. In any event the collateral issue
involved is simple and hence weighs but little against admissibility.
But suppose W had not been convicted of the perjury, i.e., had never
been called to answer for it. The issue of logic is the same as where there
has been a conviction. But considerations of auxiliary policy, looking to
exclusion, become more pronounced. If it is sought to prove W's guilt of
the offense by other witnesses the evils of surprise and collateral issue are
significant enough, as compared with the evidential value of the fact, to
justify the uniform rule of exclusion. The determination of W's guilt could
easily loom as large as the main issue in the case and there would be no
opportunity in advance to prepare to defend W against such an accusation.
Extrinsic testimony to particular acts, except where there has been conviction, is universally conceded to be inadmissible, because of consideration
of auxiliary policy. (Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 979 and 987.) These considerations of auxiliary policy are: (1) Confusion of issues; (2) undue
(89)
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consumption of time; (3) unfair surprise since such collateral issue cannot
be anticipated and, hence, no preparation can be made to meet it. (McKune
v. U. S. (C.C.A. 1924), 296 Fed. 480.) If, however, the method of securing
evidence of W's guilt of the offense were restricted to admissions that might
be secured from him on cross-examination, these adverse auxiliary considerations would be eliminated. And thus it is that England and a substantial
number of American jurisdictions, within the court's discretion, permit this
mode of attacking the veracity-character of a witness, the evils of both surprise and collateral issue being avoided by holding that the cross-examiner is
bound by the answer of the witness. (Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 981, 986,
987; 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 659; Jones, Evidence (2d ed.), secs. 2360 and 2363;
Taylor, Evidence (12th ed.), vol. II, sec. 1434 et seq.; 21 Ill.L.R. 79;
Mobley v. State (1931), 232 S.W. 53; State v. Downs (1920), 284 Mo. 695,
224 S.W. 707; State v. Clemenger (1921, N.M.), 202 Pac. 687; Shepard v.
Parker (1867), 36 N.Y. 517; Kell v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 374, 142 N.E.
865; State v. Gibson (1930, Kan.), 292 Pac. 931; Hawaii v. Luning, 11
Hawaii 390 (excellent decision); Beebe v. Kneff, 28 Mich. 52, 70 (emphasizing court's discretion); State v. Christensen (1931), 132 Kan. 192, 195,
294 Pac. 592; McAllister v. State, 99 Ark. 604, 615 (if witness had participated in an assassination, allowable on cross-examination); Spencer v. Robbins, 106 Ind. 580, 585 (emphasizing element of discretion) ; Bagley v. State
(1929), 180 Ark. 267, 271 (cross-examiner bound by answer).
The contrary view, which precludes even resort by cross-examination
to particular acts, where there is no record of conviction, is based in part
upon a misconception of the evils of surprise and collateral issue. If the
attack upon the witness does not go beyond cross-examination, none of the
considerations of policy embraced in confusion of issues, waste of time and
unfair surprise would be present. But, in support of the rule of complete exclusion, there are other considerations of auxiliary policy, the force of which cannot be lightly pushed aside. It is true, as even the courts which allow such
cross-examination concede, that an unfair, if not to say unethical, attorney
may subvert the whole process evidentially, by insinuating a baseless course
of misconduct to the witness by the mere asking of questions relative thereto.
It is also urged that any procedure so calculated as this, even at its best,
to convert the witness stand into a chamber of horrors will tend to deter
persons from appearing as witnesses. (Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 983;
Wharton, Criminal Evidence, sec. 472; Jones, Evidence (2d ed.), sec. 2364;
Com. v. Schaffner (1888), 146 Mass. 512, 513.)
California has adhered strictly to the rule prohibiting any attempt even
on cross-examination to inquire into specific acts of misconduct where the
only relevancy of such act would be to show bad character for veracity. It
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may be error even to ask the questions because such asking insinuates misconduct and the harm cannot be averted by sustaining an objection to the
question. (People v. Wells (1893), 100 Cal. 459; People v. Crandall
(1899), 125 Cal. 129, 133 (but see dissenting opinion) ; People v. Casanova
(1921), 54 Cal.App. 439,444; People v. Clarke (1900), 130 Cal. 642, 646;
Adams v. People, 87 Colo. 188, 198; State v. Carson (1876), 66 Me. 116,
117. But cases must be clearly distinguished in which the wrongful act has
implications other than absence of truthful character, for example, where it
shows bias, People v. Williams (1921), 52 Cal.App. 609, 611, or corrupt
conduct relative to the pending case, Lewis v. Sterger, 68 Cal. 200. (In
accord with California see: Kolb v. Union Ry. Co., 29 R.I. 72, 49 Ad. 392,
394; State v. Shuth (1922), 97 Conn. 462, 117 Ad. 508.)
In answer to these arguments it may be urged (1) that rules should not
be predicated upon factors that can enter only through unethical practices;
(2) that the witness is afforded some protection by exercising his privilege
against incrimination and in some jurisdictions against disgracing himself
(though as a practical matter this protection is quite inadequate for the reason
that the harm is done when the question is asked and the privilege is asserted) ;
(3) that the court, by discretionary power of interceding, may prevent the
more obvious abuses, and finally (4) that the urge to do justice in the pending
case outweighs the possible evils that inhere in the method, especially the
evil of embarrassment to the witness.
As a partial answer to the argument based upon the possible resort to
unfair tactics by the cross-examiner, attention may be called to the practice
which uniformly allows a cross-examiner to ask a character witness for a
defendant in a criminal case, who has testified to the defendant's good reputation, whether he has not heard of this or that particular escapade of the
defendant. This process is also open to abuse. Referring to this very situation, Wigmore (sec. 988), declares:
"The value of the inquiry (i.e., whether witness had not heard thus and so
about accused) for testing purposes, is often so small and the opportunities of
its abuse by underhanded ways are so great that the practice may amount to little

more than a mere subterfuge, and should be strictly supervised by forbidding it
to counsel who do not use it in good faith."

The same abuses here are possible. Also like abuses are possible in
cross-examination as to any impeaching facts, e.g., as to prior contradictory
statements, or matters of bias. It is agreed, for example, that a witness may

be interrogated as to a specific act such as an illicit sexual relation with the
party for whom he had appeared as a witness, as bearing upon the issue of
bias. Other witnesses even may be called to show such specific act. The
difference between this and our supposed case would be said to reside in
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the fact that the evidence sought has greater value and hence can more readily
carry the luggage of auxiliary evils.
These are the pros and cons to be weighed in determining what the rule
should be. The decision is a difficult one.
For purposes of illustration in the foregoing discussion, we have assumed
an act which is definitely related to that phase of character with which we
are concerned, where the problem is one of impeachment, e.g., an act of
perjury. From this, however, as a mere point of departure the trail leads
directly into the maze of controversy and uncertainty as to what particular
kind of acts of misconduct point with sufficient definiteness to lack of character
for veracity to justify their use. This should not be overlooked in determining
what the basic rule should be. There is much to be said in favor of a complete
prohibition of any use of specific acts as evidence of veracity-character, even
though limited to cases of conviction. On the contrary a practical argument
in favor not only of retaining but even of extending the use of particular acts
as affecting credibility is that it satisfies the common impression as to what
the jury ought to know about the witnesses that appear before it. Since scientifically or practically we cannot be dogmatic in our conclusions one way or
the other as to the question on its basic merits, the advantage of having the
judicial process which cannot work in any event with precision, at least reflect
the point of view of the average person who is dependent upon it or functions
in it should, perhaps, prevail.
1. Cases Allowing Cross-Examination as to Specific Acts to Show Lack of
Veracity-Character
Taylor v. Com. Fire Ins. Co. (1926, Mo.App.), 285 S.W. 1012. (Not
reported in official reports.) Action on fire insurance policy. Wife of P was
asked on cross-examination as to whether or not she had been guilty of
adultery. It was held that the trial court was in error in ruling out this crossexamination.
Such cross-examination is proper in the attempt to impair the credit of
the witness. He may be compelled to answer such questions, however disgraceful the answer may be, except where it might expose him to criminal
charge.
NOTE: This case is commented upon in 27 Col.L.Rev. 223. The note points
out that the courts are divided as to whether a witness may be cross-examined
as to specific acts of moral misconduct, the preponderance of authority being
that he may not, "as the chastity of a witness does not necessarily bear on his
habit of truth-telling." "Modern psychology would indicate that the connection between moral aberrations and truth-telling is, to say the least, extremely
slight . . .". It will be noted that the attack which this note makes on the
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Missouri case is based entirely upon the point of the logical irrelevancy
of this particular misconduct.
Oxier v. U. S. (1896), 1 Ind.Terr. 85, 38 S.W. 331, the trial court was
affirmed in permitting counsel to ask witness on cross-examination if he had
not been arrested for larceny.
The court points out that a clear distinction must be drawn between crossexamining a witness as to specific acts of misconduct and the proof of such
acts by other witnesses. Independent proof engenders a multiplicity of collateral and confusing issues and would result in unfair surprise as to matters
which the witness could not be prepared to meet. But these objections do not
obtain when the inquiry stops with the cross-examination of the witness, as
it must.
Abuses may be guarded against by the privilege of the witness to decline
to answer a collateral question which would disgrace or incriminate him
and "by the power of the court on its own motion, to prevent an unreasonable
or abusive cross-examination."
Hawaiiv. Luning (1898), 11 Hawaii 390. A prosecution for sodomy.
The trial court ruled out cross-examination of the prosecuting witness as to
stealing money, as to immorality with loose women, and as to participation
in an act of sodomy. Held: Reversible error. It does not appear on what
ground the court refused to permit this cross-examination. The defendant
claims that the ruling was made as a matter of law and not of discretion.
It is a matter of discretion, but "the discretion should be exercised liberally."
In this case a searching inquiry should have been permitted as to the
immorality and depravity of the witness "even if it tended to disgrace him."
If such cross-examination were prohibited:
"a dishonest witness would have the same standing as an honest one and in most
cases could not be impeached. His moral character can be shown (as distingushed
from his character directly for the truth and veracity) because experience shows
that a person of general degraded character is not as worthy of belief as one of
general good character. It is better that the witness be shown up for what he is,
in the interests of truth and the rights of the parties, than that witnesses themselves
be exempt from having their lives exposed to some extent, and this exposure will
be limited by the discretion of the judge and the interests of the party and his
counsel."
McAlister v. State (1911), 99 Ark. 604, 615. Held: The court did not
err in permitting the state on cross-examination to ask a defense witness if
he, in association with others, had not been engaged in the assassination of a
Negro. An affirmative answer would have tended to prove that the witness:
"was so utterly depraved as to render him wholly unworthy of belief. Any question may be asked a witness on cross-examination tending to prove that he is guilty
of specific acts involving moral turpitude, for all such acts would tend to affect
his credibility as a witness. .. "
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"The right to impair the evidence of a witness by cross-examination must not
be confounded with the right to impeach a witness by evidence introduced by the
opposite party. The former may be exercised within a more extended range than
the latter."
State v. Smith (1927), 145 Wash. 250, 259 Pac. 711. In a prosecution
for gambling, one of the state's witnesses was asked on cross-examination if
he had not lived in adultery with a woman in Portland. Held: It was reversible
error to refuse defendant's counsel the right to put the questions.
NOTE: But see State v. Gafney, 151 Wash. 599, 601, assuming to overrule this case.
People v. Arnold (1879), 40 Mich. 710. Prosecution for larceny from
a store. On cross-examination the prosecuting witness was asked if he had
not, while a member of a banking firm, embezzled certain funds. Held: It
was error to refuse defendant's counsel the right to ask the question.
"It was important that the jury know the moral character and antecedents
of the prosecuting witness. While the witness doubtless could have exercised his
privilege against self-incrimination, this furnishes no ground for objection by the
prosecution."
Spencer v. Robbins, 106 Ind. 580, 585. The trial court ruled out crossexamination designed to show that witness had been guilty of adultery. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
"This method of discrediting a witness can rarely, if ever be competent ...
It may be proper . . . under extraordinary circumstances, to ask questions of
a witness on cross-examination for the purpose of showing his character and
antecedents. This is a matter, however, within the sound discretion of the nisi
prius court, to be exercised in each case as necessity may seem to require."
2. Cases Denying This Method of Attacking Credibility
Estate of Gird (1910), 157 Cal. 534, 547. Witness on cross-examination
was asked how many men she had sexual intercourse with and who they were.
Objection sustained. Held: Affirmed.
"The only other basis on which it could be claimed to be a proper question
was that of impeachment of the witness. But it is thoroughly settled that 'questions
on cross-examination, tending to show the general immorality of the witness, or
specific acts of immorality should never be allowed in any case for the mere
purpose of discrediting or impeaching the witness. . . . The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the method of impeaching witnesses, and they can be impeached
in no other way than therein provided."
NOTE: It will be observed that the only reason given for excluding this
method of discrediting a witness is the formal one, based upon the construction of the code provisions relative to impeachment. The conclusion thus
reached on this basis is not a necessary one.
In McAlister v. State, 99 Ark. 604, 614, a similar statute was encoun-
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tered but the court in allowing cross-examination as to a specific illegal act
reasoned that the statute had reference only to the process of impeaching
a witness by the testimony of other witnesses and had no application to the
processes of cross-examination. Also see opinion by Temple, J., in People v.
Crandall (1899), 125 Cal. 129 at 136.
People v. Owens (1901), 132 Cal. 469. Prosecution for murder. This
case holds that the trial court properly excluded cross-examination calculated
to bring out the fact that the female witness was living illicitly with a certain
man. The opinion declares that a witness cannot be impeached in this way.
The only reason given is that if such method were allowed "then all kinds of
matters tending to degrade a witness could be inquired into upon cross-examination-matters wholly foreign to the issue upon trial, and only serving
the single purpose of prejudicing the witness in the eyes of the jurors."
NOTE: The implication here is either that such evidence has no logical
bearing on credibility or that its prejudicial effect is likely to exceed such
evidential value as it possesses.
People v. Crandall (1899), 125 Cal. 129. Charge of murder. Defendant's wife testified for him. On cross-examination the prosecuting attorney
was allowed to ask questions calculated to bring out the fact that the witness
lived by prostitution. Held: Error.

The following reasons are assigned:
1. Section 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly forbids impeachment
of a witness "by evidence of particular acts."
2. The purpose and effect of such examination is to degrade the witness.
The prejudicial effect is not removed by the negative answers of the witness.
The asking of the question insinuates a belief on the part of the attorney
that the witness is guilty of misconduct. This insinuation affects the credibility
of the witness in spite of his denial.
Temple, J., in a concurring opinion reversing the case, disagrees with
Van Dyke, J., who wrote the main opinion, as to rule relative to this matter
of cross-examination. Henshaw, J., and Beatty, J., concur with Temple.
Points in the Opinion of Temple, I.:
1. The English rule and the one largely followed in the United States allows such
examination for purposes of impeachment, subject to a wide discretion.
2. Such inquiries cannot be made merely for the purpose of degrading the witness.
It is the "duty of the court to interfere as well to protect the witness from what
becomes an injustice or an insult as to prevent the time of the court from being
wasted."

3. Greenleaf is quoted to the effect that he sees no reason for allowing a privilege
to the witness to refuse to answer a degrading question. Stephens' Digest is
also quoted to the effect that a witness may decline to answer an incriminating
question, but not one which merely tends to disgrace him.
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4. As to the actual state of the law, Temple, J., declares (p. 138):
"In fact, except in this state, the rule is quite uniform that in the discretion
of the trial court such questions may be asked.
"Nor do I admit that a different rule has been established here. Most of the
cases have no bearing upon the general proposition. Of course, such examination
is not allowable in every case.
"Upon the authorities, and upon principle I think, the trial judge may permit
such examination when he deems that the ends of justice would be promoted by
so doing, but, if he refuses, his discretion will rarely be interfered with."

NOTE: I observe on page 138 in Temple's opinion one statement which
leaves me in doubt as to the full meaning of this opinion. He quotes from
Stephen's Digest as to cross-examination to test credibility as follows:
"Where a witness is cross-examined he may be asked any question which
tends: (1) to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility; or (2) to shake his credit
by injuring his character. He may be compelled to answer such question, however
irrelevant to the fact in issue, and however disgraceful to himself, except where
the answer might expose him to a criminal charge."

And then adds:

"and under our statute, it may be added, where it tends to prove particularwrongjul acts. In fact, except in this state, the rule is quite uniform that in the discretion
of the trial court questions may be asked."

Is Justice Temple assuming to make a distinction between the right to
inquire on cross-examination as to a specific act of illicit intercourse and
living by prostitution? The inquiry involved in the principal case was of the
latter sort. His statement is ambiguous.
Elliott v. Boyles (1851), 31 Pa. 65. Action for slander. A witness for
plaintiff testified to speaking of words by defendant. On cross-examination
this witness was asked if he had not in another case committed perjury. This
was not an inquiry as to conviction. On objection the question was excluded.
Held: Affirmed. Reasons: (1) Character is not properly evidence by a single
act; (2) unfair surprise, impracticable to meet such accusations; (3) confusion of issues, by injecting collateral issue; (4) unfair thus to humiliate
witness.
NOTE: (1), (2) and (3) are not valid objections, where the matter is
confined to cross-examination.
State v. Carson (1876), 66 Me. 116, 117. Charge of murder. The
defendant, who became a witness, was asked on cross-examination as to an
assault committed on another person. Held: It was error to permit such crossexamination.
"The witness must be prepared to vindicate his general character for truth
and to meet the proper evidence of a prior conviction of an infamous crime. . ..
But he cannot be required to be prepared to vindicate himself against any alleged
crime that may be insinuated in the form of cross-examination, and of which he
has no previous notice. ..

"
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Adams v. People (1930), 87 Colo. 188, 190. A witness for the prosecution was asked on cross-examination: (1) If he had not been divorced;
(2) how long he had been a stool pigeon; (3) if he had not been a guest at
a certain hotel the night of a certain robbery and if he did not suddenly
vacate his room; (4) if he had not been a bootlegger; (5) if he had not stolen
a coat from a certain man. Held: Such questions were all irrelevant. "They
were asked for the evident purpose of embarrassment, and tended to interject
collateral issues. Counsel should have received severe censure. Witnesses
should be protected against such insults."
Commonwealth v. Schaffner, 146 Mass. 512, 515, 516. A witness was
asked on cross-examination concerning the writing of a letter making a corrupt offer in relation to the coloring of vinegar, and the letter was introduced.
Held: The admission of the letter was erroneous.
"We are aware that in England and in some of the U. S. this latitude of crossexamination has sometimes been allowed; though not without protests that the
practice ought to be restricted. Taylor, Ev. secs. 1459-1461; People v. Irving,
95 N.Y. 541; Stephen, Ev. (Chase's Am. Ed.) 225, 277; 1 Whart. Ev. secs. 541,
542. In Massachusetts the rule has been that a witness cannot be asked on crossexamination, in order to affect his credibility, about his part in transactions irrelevant to the issue on trial. .. "
"The letter was admitted in order to impeach his testimony, and it may have
had that effect on the jury. The case thus falls within the rule which has prevailed
in this Commonwealth, and we are satisfied that both witnesses and parties ought
"
to be protected from being obliged to encounter such collateral charges ...

NOTE: Wigmore's review of the Massachusetts decisions indicates some
wobbling on this subject. Chief Justice Shaw in Hathaway et al. v. Crocker,
48 Mass. 262, stresses the principle of discretion of the trial court in crossexamining as to collateral matters. (See, also, Com. v. Sacco (1924, Mass.),
151 N.E. 839, allowing wide latitude in cross-examination.)
B. ACTS AS INDICATIVE OF Bins OR MOTIVE

Matters designed to reveal bias on the part of a witness are of so much
force in their bearing on credibility that countervailing exclusionary considerations of auxiliary policy yield. Thus it seems to be uniformly conceded that a specific act evidential of bias may not only be inquired into on
cross-examination but may be testified to by other witnesses.
In view of the attitude of the courts toward inquiries into specific acts of
misconduct on the part of a witness as revealed in the foregoing discussion
it is important to note whether they are evidential of veracity-character merely
or whether they also argue bias. Thus it makes a difference whether one seeks
to show that the witness has had illicit relations with a party to the action or
with a stranger to the pending proceeding.
People v. Williams (1921), 52 Cal.App. 609, 611. Statutory rape.
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There was testimony to the effect that prior to defendant's arrest he had found
the complainant in an act of intercourse with a young man and had called the
justice. He argues that this caused a hatred of him by the girl and led her to
make the accusation against him. Held: The trial court properly instructed
the jury that the moral delinquency of the girl complainant was not to be
considered as affecting her credibility. This instruction was properly supplemented by another instruction to the effect that the jury could consider any
motive which might impel the witness to testify, such as hopes, fears, friendship, or animosity.
People v. Worthington (1894), 105 Cal. 166, 170, 38 Pac. 689. Murder.
On cross-examination of a witness for the state the defendant attempted to
bring out the fact that the witness had had illicit relations with the deceased
to show an animus toward the defendant. Held: It was error to exclude
this cross-examination.
People v. Soleates (1915), 27 Cal.App. 288. Prosecution for lewd
conduct. The mother of the prosecutrix was the only witness called by the
defendant. Her testimony was very favorable to the defendant. Held: It was
proper on cross-examination to ask this witness if she had not had sexual
intercourse a number of times with the defendant, as tending to show her
interest in the defendant and thereby affecting her credibility as a witness.
Anderson v. Black (1886), 70 Cal. 226, 228. It was held proper not
only to cross-examine a witness for the plaintiff as to an unlawful assault with
a gun made by the witness on the defendant but to call other witnesses to prove
such conduct.
It was argued for the plaintiff that the evidence was inadmissible because
in violation of section 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was an effort
to impeach a witness by proof of prior immoral and illegal acts.
This position is not tenable for it is made clear that this evidence was
offered "for the purpose, not of exhibiting the witness to the jury as one
unworthy of belief because of commission of a crime or unlawful act, but
as one who, if he had taken part in a violent demonstration against the defendants of the kind designated in the language of query put to him, might perhaps have been thought by the jury to be biased or to entertain ill will against
the defendants." Such circumstances "tend to impeach his credibility by
showing that he is biased.... " (See, also, Barkly v. Copeland (1890),
86 Cal. 483,488.)
State v. Harness (1904), 10 Idaho 18, 22. Held: It was not only proper
to cross-examine a witness as to her illicit relations for the purpose of showing
her animus against the defendant but also to have other witnesses testify to
such misconduct.
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Leach v. Commonwealth (1908), 129 Ky. 497. Prosecution for murder.
Held: It was error to preclude defendant from offering extrinsic evidence
that the chief witness for the state and the deceased had been having illicit
relations. This evidence went to the question of bias and not to lack of veracity
by reason of immorality. Moreover the witness under cross-examination cannot decline to answer such an inquiry because the answer would disgrace her.
C. SPECIFIC ACTS WHERE THE WITNESS HAS BEEN CONVICTED

1. In General
Section 2051 of the Code of Civil Procedure limits this method of
impeachment to conviction of a felony. In its application the statute has
presented few problems. It explicitly provides that the fact of conviction
"may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment."
This method of impeachment goes to the issue of character. The character we are concerned about is character for truthfulness. The assumption
back of the statute therefore, is that one who has been convicted of any felony
lacks not merely the particular kind of character immediately involved in the
act, but also that the implication of impaired veracity is definitely justified.
This fundamental inquiry suggests itself. Is there any certain interrelationship of character defects? To what extent may it be inferred that
one who violates one of the ten commandments will violate another of the
commandments? Put otherwise, if we wish to know whether W, who has
casually witnessed an automobile accident, has lied in giving his testimony,
of what value is it to know that he had at some prior time been guilty of
murder, or rape, or violating the liquor law? Until such inquiry can be
answered we cannot know whether and to what extent conviction of crime has
an impeaching value. The scientific answer lies in the field of studies in
character. The answer that the law has returned has not been uniform and
has doubtless been based largely upon hunches. The following is a sampling
of judicial expression:
"The issue always is the truth of the witness' testimony. In other words, is
the witness devoid of moral perception, such a person as would regard lightly the
obligations of an oath to tell the truth? In judging of a man's moral fiber, his
previous conduct covering a reasonable time before the inquiry, undoubtedly has
a real and substantial bearing upon the question. It seems to us that there can be
little argument that previous conduct of a witness can be shown to be such as, by
the common experience of the average man, would justify a belief of his unworthiness as a witness. Certainly if it had been shown that a witness had previously
been convicted of perjury, it would materially discredit, if not destroy, the value
of his testimony. Conviction of many other crimes could properly have the same
effect, while on the other hand, there may be convictions of violations of hundreds
of police regulations, which in no real or true sense can be taken as tending to
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make one so convicted unworthy of belief." (Burgess v. State (Md.), 155 Ad.
153, 156. In this case it was held that the trial court acted within its discretion
in excluding evidence that the witness had been convicted of assault and sentenced
to jail for 180 days.)
"There are many crimes the commission of which conclusively prove an utter
want of moral character, such as seduction, arson, perjury, forgery, larceny,
obtaining money or goods under false pretenses. .

.

. They all necessarily

impute disgrace and infamy. If a witness has been convicted of any of this class
of offenses, it should be known to the jury, as indicating a tendency to deceit and
falsehood. .

.

. The illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, wrongfully and deliber-

ately committed, is an immoral, degrading and degraded act, and is committed
only by the lawless and unreliable classes of our population. .

.

. The unlawful

sale of intoxicating liquor involves moral turpitude and shows a want of moral
character." (Hendrix v. State (1911, Okla.), 113 Pac. 244. But see contra, as to
violation of liquor law, Broker v. State (Ala.), 121 So. 3.)
"That the credibility of a witness should be sought through his general moral
character I have no doubt." (Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. 146, 151.)
The law which today identifies conviction of a crime and lack of credibility goes back to the early common law which rendered incompetent witnesses who had been convicted of an infamous crime. The theory was that
such persons were "So destitute of moral honesty that truth could not dwell
in them." (Williams v. U. S., 3 Fed.(2d) 129.)
The extent of this category of crime designated as "infamous crime,"
has never been definitely set. In State v. Bezemer (1932, Wash.) 14 Pac. (2d)
460, the court makes the following observation:
"Infamous crimes included treason, felony, perjury. Any offense that tended
to pervert the administration of justice and those that fell within the term 'crimen
Jalsi' at the Roman Law XX. But whatever may have been the test of the infamous
character of crime at the common law or in the earlier decisions of this country,
the modern doctrine and view are that any crime punishable by imprisonment
in the State Penitentiary is an infamous crime."
When in various jurisdictions the common law rule of incompetency
was removed a rule of credibility was substituted. The statutory provisions
have varied: In England the statute (28 Vict.C. 18) specifies conviction of
"any felony or misdemeanor." In some of the American jurisdictions impairment of credibility is restricted to conviction of a "felony"; in other states
the statutes read "Convicted of any criminal offense" (Mo.Rev.Stat. 6383
and Mo.Rev.Stat. 4926 define "criminal offense" to include misdemeanors
as well as felonies); in Texas (Branch, Am. Penal Code, sec. 167) the
language is "felony" or "misdemeanor imputing moral turpitude."
The lack of agreement both in statutory specification and in judicial
decision is thus substantial. The objective is the same. The concern is veracity.
The means of determining its existence varies.

SPECIFIC ACTS AND RELATED MATTERS AS AFFECTING CREDIBILITY

101

The scientist, as Mr. Wigmore points out, is not too favorably impressed
by the law's handling of the problem of character. He says:
"From the point of view of modern psychology, the moral disposition which
tends for or against falsehood is an elusive quality. Its intermittent operation in
connection with other tendencies, and the difficulty of ascertaining its quality and
force, make it by no means a feature peculiarly reliable in the diagnosis of testimonial credit. Hence, to the psychologist, the common law's reliance on character
as an index of falsehood is crude and childish." (Wigmore, see. 922.)
Against this background what picture shall we paint for the future?
I do not believe that the job can be done at the present time, as we may ultimately wish to have it. This apparently is likewise Mr. Wigmore's thought
on the subject for he says:
"....

Psychology itself has thus far discovered no feasible substitute (for

the traditional legal approach). The crude belief of the common law-must therefore hold its place until science provides a better method."
I would add to this a few observations by way of tentative suggestion or
perhaps only by way of quaere: (1) There can be little justification for an
arbitrary dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors. The "grand"
thief and the "petit" thief are not essentially different as to "character."
(2) Since we do not know scientifically where to draw a line between criminal
acts which argue lack of veracity and those which do not, may it not be just
as well to allow evidence of conviction of any crime-felony or misdemeanor.
As a practical matter it is not likely that a violation of a petty traffic regulation would be tendered for impeachment purposes, and if it were no harm
other than a little waste of time would occur. Throwing the rule open would
avoid legal quibble; and wherever this can be accomplished it represents a
gain. Some authorities would make "moral turpitude" the dividing line. But
a reading of the cases show singular lack of unanimity of opinion as to what
constitutes an offense involving moral turpitude. It would seem preferable
therefore to let the jury make its own determination. In State v. Johnson,
76 Utah 84,287 Pac. 909, the dissenting opinion quotes with approval from
Wigmore, section 403, to the effect that "The tendency is to a simplicity
of rule defining the kinds of crime (i.e., either all crimes or felonies only)
instead of the common-law subtleties." (3) Is there appreciable merit in
the rule, obtaining in a few jurisdictions, which places restrictions upon this
mode of impeachment when the witness is a defendant in a criminal case?
West Virginia rules out proof of conviction of any crime for impeachment
when the accused is the witness. (State v. Webb (W.Va., 1925), 128 S.E.
97.) (4) Assuming that the character of a witness for veracity is open to
question, is that an item of any significance except in cases where the witness
is under a definite motive to falsify the facts? Given a bias, one can understand that a witness lacking in character stability would readily lie to support
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his bias. But absent a bias, is it not more reasonable to assume that subjective truthfulness would govern?
Wigmore, supplement, 1934), section 980 (2a).
"There is, however, one type of witness as to whom a prior conviction of an
offense involving chastity should undoubtedly be received, viz.: a woman-complainant in a sex offense . . . ." At this point should be noted, therefore, the
unwisdom of the juvenile court laws (sec. 196) which forbids that any record of
a finding in such court be used against the juvenile in another court."

A few additional problems call for mention.
2. Remoteness of Prior Conviction
The rule more commonly followed treats remoteness as affecting weight
merely, not admissibility. (Murray v. U. S. (D.C., 1922), 288 Fed. 1008,
lapse of 10 or 11 years; State v. Farmer (Me., 1892), 24 Atl. 985, lapse of
27 years; Merrill v. U. S. (Ore., 1925), 6 Fed.(2d) 120, lapse of 13 years;
State v. Hensack (Mo., 1905), 88 S.W. 21, witness convicted of misdemeanor
some 25-30 years previous and later pardoned; State v. Bezemer (1932),
14 Pac.(2d) 460, lapse of more than 20 years.) The Texas rule, however,
has merit. It excludes the evidence if the conviction is "too remote." Texas
decisions: Vick v. State, 159 S.W. 50: "Unless there is other evidence showing
a continuity of criminal acts, a conviction had more than 7 years prior to
the commission of the offense for which he is then on trial would be too
remote and should not be admitted"; Shipp v. State, 283 S.W. 520: "At what
period of time testimony . . . discrediting . . . to veracity becomes too
remote . . . cannot be arbitrarily determined by the courts. . . . In the

due administration of justice, the idea of reform-the fact that an individual
once bad may have amended his ways-is not to be ignored by the courts";
Gott v. State (1933), 60 S.W.(2d) 223, conviction when 15 years of age,
lapse of 10 years, no evidence of intervening criminal acts-time too remote;
Cawthorn v. State (1930), 24 S.W.(2d) 435, rape committed eight years
before, not too remote; Fritts v. State (1931), 42 S.W.(2d) 609, perjury 10
years before not too remote. (Mass. Gen. Laws, 1932, sec. 21, p. 2904.)
"Conviction of misdemeanor shall not be shown for such purpose after five
years (from date of sentence) unless subsequently convicted of a crime
within five years."
3. Scope of Inquiry Relative to PriorConviction. (See 7 Wash.L.Rev. 303.)
One can understand the urge to go into some details, both pro and con,
relative to the offense of which the witness was convicted. However, the rule
fairly uniformly followed limits the inquiry to the name of the offense. In
any event the inquiry should not be carried beyond those matters which
appear on the record of the conviction. Any other rule is impracticable, for
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the former case could not be tried over again and practicable limits short of
that could not be readily fixed if the matter were opened at all. Wigmore
(sec. 1117) suggests, however, that "it would seem a harmless charity to
allow the witness to make such protestations (explanations) on his own behalf
as he may feel able to make with a due regard to the penalties of perjury."
He cites a few cases in which the witness was allowed to try to rehabilitate
himself by his own explanation. But Holmes, J., in Lamoureux v. R. Co.,
169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009, held, on practical grounds, that no attempted
explanation by the witness should be allowed, declaring that "if one side goes
into the matter, the other must be allowed to also." See the following cases
supporting Wigmore: Hopper v. State (Ark.), 296 S.W. 595; Ry. v. Beatty
(Ky.), 50 S.W. 239; State v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 532.
State v. Roybal (N.M.), 273 Pac. 919. Held: That the trial court properly sustained an objection to the following question:
"In that cattle stealing case that you admitted you were convicted in, you were
sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary and were fined $500.00?"
The court said:
"Under a statute like ours, we do not see that a greater or more burdensome

term of service would add anything to the discredit of a witness shown to have
been convicted. If that were so, the witness might then come back and show good
behavior as a prisoner, commutation of sentence, parole, or other circumstances
which would, as the Illinois court said, introduce into the case further collateral
issues. Likewise; under the Garcia case (Territory v. Garcia,15 N.M. 538) supra,
if the conviction may not be explained by the withess to his advantage, we do not
see how the nature or extent of the punishment or term of service under a conviction is material."
State v. Friend (Iowa, 1930), 230 N.W. 425. Held: Proper to ask witness if he had not been convicted in Minnesota of crime of rape-a felony.
The court declared that, while the statute said "felony," the inquiry is not
limited to the language of the statute, except in a case where the accused in
a criminal case is the witness and the prior conviction is for the same kind
of offense; in the latter case the prior offense should be described merely as
a "felony" because of the misuse the jury would make of the evidence of a
prior conviction of the same kind of crime.

Dodds v. State (Miss.), 45 So. 863. After bringing out the fact that
defendant (the witness under cross-examination) had been convicted of a
"'crime" and had served a term in the penitentiary therefor, the prosecutor
inquired whether the conviction was for cutting a white man's throat. It was
held that this was improper cross-examination, especially since it brought in
race prejudice.
State v. Gottenfreedson (Wash.), 64 Pac. 523. Defendant was convicted
of horse stealing. He became a Witness and on cross-examination he was
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compelled to tell that he had previously been convicted of horse stealing.
Held: This was error.
"... When it was shown that the defendant had been convicted of a crime,
the demands of the statute had been met, for the purpose of the statute is only

to affect the credibility of the witness, and not to prejudice the minds of the jury
by parading before them the fact that the witness (defendant) had been guilty of
the exact crime for which he was then on trial."
State v. McBride (Mo.), 231 S.W. 592. The court held that it was not
only proper to show that the defendant, as a witness, had been convicted of
crime but to show what the crime was, viz.: "grand larceny" at one time and
"robbery" at another.
Powers v. State (Miss.), 126 So. 12. Held: Error to bring out fact that
witness had been convicted of "beating his wife and child" and that the
court in passing sentence upon him had lectured him.
"The only thing admissible under this statute is the fact of the conviction
of the crime and what crime, but the statute does not authorize the giving in
evidence of the details of the crime, or the right to examine the witness with
reference to the details of the crime. .... "
People v. Craig (1925), 196 Cal. 19, 28. May not only show conviction
of felony, but what the specific felony was.
People v. Eldredge (1905), 147 Cal. 782, 786. Proper to bring out
fact that witness had been convicted of more than one felony and name of
each particular felony. See, also, 7 Wash.L.Rev. 303 (1932), indicating
division of authority as to propriety of showing identification of crime.
NOTE: Approves Washington decision allowing inquiry as to nature of
crime.
4. CaliforniaCasesof Special Interest
People v. Stirgios (1913), 23 Cal.App. 48:
"Neither the merits nor the demerits of the confessed conviction, nor the
reasons which induced the plea of guilty upon which such conviction was founded,
were relevant to the issue. .... "
People v. Craig (1925), 196 Cal. 19, 28:
"The usual manner of making proof of a prior conviction is to ask the witness
who suffered such conviction if he has theretofore been convicted of a felony, and
if he denies that he has been so convicted, to produce a copy of the judgment of
conviction; or if he answers in the affirmative he may then be asked of what
specific crime he was convicted."
People v. Eldredge (1905), 147 Cal. 782, 786. It is proper to bring out
not only the name of the particular felony, but also the number of felonies
of which the witness was convicted.
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People v. Hardwick (1928), 204 Cal. 582, 588. A pardon does not
preclude evidence of conviction of a felony, but the fact of pardon, without
details, may be offered in rebuttal. The case holds that the trial court was in
error not only in rejecting evidence of the pardon, but in instructing the jury
that one "who has been convicted of a felony is less likely to be honest and
truthful in his testimony" than one who has not been so convicted. The effect
of the conviction upon credibility of the witness, declares the court, is exclusively for the jury. Credit is not "as a matter of law" destroyed. The court
notes some conflict in the cases relative to the significance of a pardon (observing especially that Illinois excludes evidence of pardon, Gallagherv. People,
211 Ill. 158) but concludes that it is entitled to evidential value where character is involved. It phrases its conclusion thus:
"From this rather lengthy r6sum6 of the authorities, it is apparent that sound
reason and a proper sense of justice dictate that the jury should be left to determine the credibility of the witness after having laid before it the pardon. That
while the subject of wrongful conviction, if such in fact it was, may not be inquired
into because that would require a lengthy examination into collateral matters,
nevertheless the pardon is a proper subject of evidence."
People v. Arnold (1897), 116 Cal. 682, 686. The information charged
an assault with intent to commit murder and alleged a prior conviction of a
felony. In accordance with the provisions of section 1093 of the Penal Code,
the defendant confessed the conviction of the prior felony, and thereby
excluded reference to it upon the reading of the information to the jury. The
defendant became a witness in his own behalf and the prosecution asked him
on cross-examination whether he had been convicted of a felony. It was
objected that this constituted a violation of section 1093 of the Penal Code.
The trial court was affirmed in overruling the objection. The court said:
"The obvious purpose of this section was to give the defendant the benefit
of withholding from the jury a knowledge of such prior conviction, in all instances
other than where, by the conduct of his own case, the production of such fact is
rendered essential to a proper presentation of the case of the people. It was not
designed thereby to change or affect the ordinary rules of evidence for the elucidations of truth; to which a defendant, like any other witness, subjects himself upon
taking the witness stand."
See, also, to the same effect People v. Oliver (1908), 7 Cal.App. 601,
603, and People v. Johnson (1881), 57 Cal. 571, 574. In the Johnson case
the court makes the following observation relative to the evils which inhere
in the rule which permits this type of impeaching evidence when the witness
is the defendant in a criminal case."
"The question as to previous conviction is only permitted to go to the credibility of the witness. The fact that the defendant has been previously convicted
of other criminal offenses is, of course, no evidence that he committed the particular offense for which he may be on trial. The consideration urged by counsel
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for appellant, that it is a difficult matter for jurors in cases where the defendant
has been previously convicted of a criminal offense to divert their minds of that
circumstance, and the consequent danger of such considerations influencing the
determination of the particular charge on trial is a question for the Legislature.
Under the existing statutes there is nothing taking the present case out of the
rules applicable to other witnesses."
(The reader may here recall references, supra, in Iowa and Washington,
excluding the naming of the felony where it is the same as the one for which
the defendant is then on trial. This to minimize the evil here referred to.)
If a person who has been placed on probation following his conviction
of a felony lives up to the terms of the probation and pursuant to section
1203.4 of the California Penal Code secures a dismissal of the proceeding,
may the record of conviction be used to impeach him as a witness? The answer
to this question requires a consideration of cases decided both prior and
subsequent to 1927 when this section of the Penal Code was amended.
People v. Mackey, 58 Cal.App. 123, decided in 1922, held that the
conviction was wiped out by the dismissal proceedings and consequently
that it could not be used for impeachment purposes. In the light of later
developments it is important to note the strong language of the court with
reference to the effect of the dismissal. At pages 130 and 131 the court says:
"We cannot avoid the conclusion . .. that the Legislature intended in a legal
sense, by directing a dismissal under such circumstances to wipe out absolutely
the entire proceeding in question in a given case and to place the defendant in
the position which he would have occupied in all respects as a witness if no
accusation or information had been directed against him. Such is the effect of
the dismissal of a criminal charge before conviction and we are convinced that the
law-making body intended, by section 1203, that the same effect should attend
dismissal after conviction. . . . On the whole, we conclude that the Legislature
intended by the enactment of section 1203 that no convicted person discharged
after probation henceforth should be regarded as one possessed of the degree of
turpitude likely to affect his credibility as a witness."
In 1927 section 1203 (now section 1203.4) was amended by adding the
following proviso:
"provided, that in any subsequent prosecution of such defendant for any other
offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proven and shall have the same
effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information
dismissed."
And now People v. James, 105 Pac.2d 947 (Cal.App., 1940). In this
case the defendant, on trial for grand theft, took the witness stand. On appeal
the trial court was affirmed in allowing the state, for purposes of impeachment,
to introduce the record of defendant's prior conviction of grand theft notwithstanding the dismissal of such proceeding on the termination of his probation. The court expressly deems the decision in the Mackey case to be nullified
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by the Penal Code amendment in 1927. The court in reaching its decision
in the instant case does not overlook the fact that the proviso in the statute
is limited to the case where there is a "subsequent prosecution of such defendant for any other offense" and in stating its general conclusion it includes this
limitation thus:
"We therefore conclude that where a defendant who has been previously

convicted of a felony and granted probation and a dismissal is obtained as in
the instant case, and is 'subsequently prosecuted for another offense' in becoming

a witness in his own behalf, he subjects himself to impeachment upon the ground
that he has been convicted of a felony."
In view of this limitation why does the court conclude that the rule of
the Mackey case is abrogated by the amendment? One may quaere further
whether the construction of the statute is sound even as to the immediate case.
Does the amendment not more readily lend itself to the construction that it
is only where the defendant is to be affected as defendant, rather than incidentally as a witness, that the prior conviction is to be kept alive? More
recently still this section of the Penal Code has come before the Supreme
Court of California for interpretation. In Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners (1949), 206 Pac.2d 1085, the Supreme Court has held (Carter, Shenk
and Schauer, J.J., dissenting) that a decision of the Board of Medical Examiners revoking the license of a physician could be predicated upon the fact
that he stood convicted of unlawfully selling narcotics, an offense involving
moral turpitude, even though the criminal prosecution' for the offense had
been dismissed pursuant to Penal Code, section 1203.4, following the completion of a probation and prior to the proceeding to revoke his license. In so
holding the Court calls to its support, among other cases, People v. Hainline,
219 Cal. 532, in which a disbarment was upheld under circumstances similar to the Meyer case, and People v. James, supra. It cites the James case
to the broader proposition that such a conviction can be used to impeach a
witness and takes exception, without qualification, to the holding in the
Mackey case that the intention of the Legislature was to "wipe out" the conviction. I submit that if the purpose of section 1203.4 as originally worded,
was not to wipe out the conviction, then it used a lot of idle language. It is
difficult to see how it could have gone farther in clearing the slate for the successful probationer. Note the plea of guilty is withdrawn, or the verdict of
guilty is set aside, and the accusation or information dismissed. The 1927
amendment leaves this language in the section and then merely adds a proviso
clause which in its language is very limited. This proviso should not be
so interpreted as in effect to nullify all of the earlier provisions of the statute
and the underlying purposes of the probation law.
As to the problem of impeachment I further submit that there is no case
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squarely contra to the Mackey case, and therefore that it may still be held
and should be held that where the impeachment of the casual witness is
involved, it violates not only the language but the very avowed purpose of the
probation law to bring in the expunged conviction of the witness to impeach
him. That purpose has been and I believe still is to secure to a person the full
benefit of his moral rehabilitation as evidenced by his compliance with the
terms of his probation. The narrow purpose of the 1927 amendment is made
clear by tying it down to the case where the defendant has made a later
misstep, i.e., to the case where he is later charged with some other offense
and further by the specific provision that there the "prior conviction may be
pleaded and proved." This language would seem to have reference to those
cases where the law provides that more serious legal consequences shall follow
for a second offense and is in no way applicable to the use of the record solely
to impeach a witness.
II. Occupation, Living Surroundings, etc., as Evidence of VeracityCharacter
The following is probably a fair statement as to this method of getting
at the veracity-character of a witness:
"As to one class of inquiry tending to degrade or debase a witness the courts
are in comparative agreement. The right to inquire of a witness as to his occupation or residence for the purpose of discrediting him is generally recognized ...
Subh inquiries are unlike dragging forth isolated instances of specific misconduct
or drawing forth the misdeeds of a past perhaps repented and atoned for. They
are proximate in point of time, they are already notorious to all who are interested and they are ordinarily broad indicia fairly representative of the sort of
person who confronts the jury." (Jones (2d Rev. Ed.), vol. 5, sec. 2366.)
The approach to such facts is by cross-examination only and the crossexaminer is bound by the answer of the witness. This, of course, keeps out
the main features of the surprise and collateral-issue evils. (Jones, Evidence
(2d Rev. Ed.), vol. 5, sec. 2367; State v. Muguerza (1928), 46 Ida. 456,
461.)
The theory upon which such matters are received is, of course, that they
bear logically and with reasonable force upon the character of the witness
for veracity. In Wilson v. State (1928), 7 S.W.(2d) 969, the court states
the logical principle as follows:
"... it is always competent to interrogate a witness on cross-examination
touching his present or recent residence, occupation and associations; and if, in
answer to such questions, the witness discloses that he has no residence or lawful
occupation but drifts about in idleness from place to place, associating with the
low and vicious these circumstances are proper for the jury to consider in
determining his credibility. That such a life tends to discredit the testimony of
the witness, no one can deny; when disclosed on cross-examination, it is exclusively for the jury to determine, whether any truth can come from such a source,
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and if so, how much. The right to impair the evidence of a witness by crossexamination must not be confounded with the right to impeach a witness by
evidence introduced by the opposite party."

In Fowler v. State (1912), 8 Okla.Cr. 130, 126 Pac. 831, the court
states:
"On cross-examination, appellant testified that the place where the homicide
occurred was a booze joint and that he was engaged in sale of intoxicating
liquors ....
It has always been held that the occupation, manner of living and
companions of a witness may be inquired into on cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting his credibility. The fact that a witness is a bootlegger may be
proven for the purpose of impeaching his reputation (character) for truthfulness,
and is as effective for this purpose as his general reputation would be."
In State v. Pinkston (1925), 33 Wyo. 428, 240 Pac. 219, it was sought
to elicit from the witness on cross-examination the fact that he was then
running a house of prostitution. The court said:
"We think the jury might very well refuse to place credence in his testimony
they otherwise would, if it were shown that he was interested in an illegal and
degrading business."
See, also, to the same effect: Musgraves v. State (1910), 3 Okla.Cr. 421,
106 Pac. 544 ("did you not run a joint there before Statehood"); People v.
Bond (1917), 281 Ill. 490, 118 N.E. 17 (witness asked if she kept a house
of ill fame); People v. White, 251 Ill. 67, 95 N.E. 1036 (as to operating a
gambling house); State v. Graziani (1929), 168 La. 297, 121 So. 872
(whether witness' place of business was not a hangout for thieves) ; Henwood
v. People (1914), 57 Colo. 544, 143 Pac. 373; Leslie v. Commonwealth
(1897), 19 Ky.L.Rep. 1201, 42 S.W. 1095 (witness asked if he was not a
gambler, if he did not make his living that way, if he did not belong to and
travel with a sleight-of-hand show, and if he did not frequent the house of
ill fame in which the killing occurred).
But compare cases excluding the inquiry where the moral element was
not apparent in the occupation or place of abode: Ry. v. Keller, 23 Tex.Civ.
App. 358 (keeping a room ostensibly as an insurance office but actually as a
Negro club, it not appearing that the club was in any way wrongful); American Metal Co. v. San Roberts Mining Co. (Tex.Civ.App., 1918), 202 S.W.
360 (operating a race track not a vicious or degrading business) ; Sweeney v.
State (1923), 161 Ark. 278, 256 S.W. 73 (occupation of gambler).
California in such matters apparently follows the same strict doctrine
of exclusion that it does in respect to specific acts and general moral character.
It seems to assume that the problem'is identical and does not discuss the situation: People v. Un Song (1895), 106 Cal. 83; People v. Vatck (1925),
71 Cal.App. 453,236 Pac. 169; People v. Chin Hane (1895), 108 Cal. 597,
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606 (defense not allowed to prove that witness for state had been an inmate
of house of prostitution).
This method of attacking credibility comes close to that of the specific
act method. There arises first the question of logical relevancy and second,
the possibility of abuse by unfounded imputation. (See Adams v. People
(1930), 87 Col. 188, 190. The court comments with severity on the conduct
of counsel.)
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